that solution its supreme law. "Fullest," that is, absolute freedom of thought and speech, he asserts by clear implication' in the entire argument of the chapter, is not to be one of several competing goods society is to foster, one that on occasion might reasonably be sacrificed, in part at least, to the preservation of other goods; i.e., he refuses to recognize any competing good in the name of which it can be limited. The silencing of dissenters on behalf of a received doctrine, of an accepted idea-this is an alternative statement-is never justified:6 it can only do hurt, unwarranted hurt, alike to the person silenced, to the individual or group that silences, to the doctrine or idea on behalf of which the silencing is done, and to the society in the name of which the silencers silence.7 The quotation I started with is, then, merely the strongest, the most intransigent, of several formulations of a general prescription he makes for advanced societies. We shall do well to examine it, phrase-by-phrase, before proceeding: "There ought to exist"-ought, so that the prescription is put forward on ethical grounds -"the fullest liberty"-a liberty, i.e., that no one (individual, group, government, even society as a whole) is entitled to interfere with-"of professing and discussing"-that is, of pub-I Those who regard "absolute" as too strong a term to be deemed a synonym of "fullest" may wish to be reminded of the following passage (ibid., p. 11): " . . . the appropriate region of human liberty ... comprises ... liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense: liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. [ 
do not exist absolute and unqualified" (italics added).
6 Cf. ibid., p. 14: " .. . I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or their government. The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst." The statement could hardly be more sweeping.
7Not to speak of "mankind." Cf. ibid., pp. 14-15: " . . . the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; . . . those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it."
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licly propagating-"as a matter of ethical conviction"-which, however, as any reader can quickly satisfy himself by re-examining Chapter II, is not intended to exclude other types of conviction, "intellectual" conviction for example-"any doctrine"-and "doctrine" is not intended to exclude, either, since he uses the term synonymously with "idea" and "opinion"; usually, indeed, he prefers the word "opinion"-"however immoral it may be considered"-where "immoral" also is used merely to cover what Mill considers the extreme case, the case in which, he supposes, people are least likely to refrain from silencing; and he would be equally willing, as the context shows, to write "however wrong," that is, "however incorrect," "however dangerous," "however foolish," or even "however harmful," and where "it may be considered" is recognizably shorthand for "it may be considered by anyone whomsoever."
It is fashionable, these days, in part because of a fairly recent book by the scientist-philosopher K. R. 
I
First, Mill must not be understood as saying, over-all, something more extravagant than he is actually saying. He is fully aware of the necessity for laws against libel and slander, and does not deem them inconsistent with his doctrine.'0 He is aware, also, of organized society's need to protect its younger members against certain forms of expression;" which is to say that his "fullest liberty of professing and discussing" is to obtain only among adults. Laws prohibiting, e.g., the circulation of obscene literature amongst school-children, or, e.g., utterance calculated to undermine the morals (however the society chooses to define morals) of a minor, are presumably not proscribed. Nor does the doctrine outlaw sanctions against incitement to crime'-provided, one must hasten to add, nothing political is involved (Mill would permit punishment for incitement to, e.g., tyrannicide, only if it could be shown to have resulted in an overt act 15 E.g., the doctrine that enemies of liberty must not be permitted to take advantage of "civil liberties" in order to undermine and destroy them; or the doctrine that free society is entitled to interfere with free expression in order to perpetuate its own existence. Mill would certainly not have countenanced either doctrine.
16 Cf. ibid., p. 14: "If all mankind were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing all mankind." freedom of thought as well, and a way of life appropriate to their maintenance. To put it otherwise: when we elevate freedom of thought and speech to the position of society's highest good, it ceases to be merely freedom of thought and speech, and becomes-with respect to a great many important matters-the society's ultimate standard of order.
Mill did not dwell upon the inescapable implications of this aspect of his position; it has been left to his epigones, especially in the United States, to think the position out. The open society, they tell us repeatedly, must see to it that all doctrines start out equal in the market-place of ideas; for society to assign an advantaged position to these doctrines rather than those would be tantamount to suppressing those; society can, therefore, have no orthodoxy, no public truth, no standard, upon whose validity it is entitled to insist; outside its private homes, its churches, and perhaps its nonpublic schools, it therefore cannot indoctrinate; all questions are for it open questions, and must, publicly, be treated as open. If it has public schools and universities, it will be told (and with unexceptionable logic), these also must treat all questions as open-otherwise what happens to the freedom of thought and so, ultimately, to the freedom of speech of the student who might have thought differently had his teachers not treated some questions as closed? Even if in their hearts and souls all the members of the open society believe in a particular religion, or a particular church, each must nevertheless be careful in his public capacity to treat all religions and churches as equal, to treat dissent, when and as it occurs, as the peer of dogma, to treat the voodoo missionary from Cuba as on an equal plane with an Archbishop of his own church.'7 The open society's first duty (so its custodians will remind it, and if not those at home then those abroad)'8 is to freedom; and that means that it is not free to give public status to its beliefs, its standards, and its loyalties. Mill's disciples are completely faithful to the spirit of his thought when they insist that if we mean business about freedom, that is how it is going to have to be. The open society confers "freedom" upon its members; but it does so at the cost of its own freedom as a society.
Third, Mill denies the existence-that is to say, at any particular place and moment-not only of a public truth,19 but of any truth what-17 Who, after all, is to say which is right? 18 As witness the sermons addressed by the New York press to the Trujillo regime.
19 Except, we must remind ourselves, the public truth that there is no public truth. ever unless it be the truth of the denial itself. (Let us not press this last too far, however, lest it seem a mere "debater's" point; it is of course, the Achilles' heel of all skepticisms.) Reduced to its simplest terms, the argument of the Essay runs as follows: whenever and wherever men disagree about a teaching, a doctrine, an opinion, an idea, we have no way of knowing which party is correct; the man (or group) who moves to silence a teaching on the ground that it is incorrect attributes to himself a kind of knowledge (Mill says an "infallibility") that no one is ever entitled to claim short of (if then) the very case where the question is sure not to arise-that is, where there is unanimity, and so no temptation to silence to begin with. When, therefore, Mill's followers demand the elevation of skepticism to the status of a national religion, and the remaking of society in that image, they are not reading into his position something that is not there-for all that Mill himself, as I have intimated, preserves a discreet silence on the detailed institutional consequences of his position. They are, rather, only making specific applications of notions that, for Mill, are the point of departure for the entire discussion.
The basic position, in fine, is not that society must have no public truth, no orthodoxy, no preferred doctrines, because it must have freedom of speech; but that it must not have them for the same reason that it must have freedom of speech, namely: because, in any given situation, no supposed truth has any proper claim to special treatment, and this in turn because it may turn out to be incorrect-nay, will turn out to be at least partially incorrect, since each competing idea is at most a partial truth. Nor is that all: Mill's freedom of speech doctrine is not merely derivative from a preliminary assault upon truth itself;20 it is inseparable from that assault and cannot, I contend, be defended on any other ground. It is incompatible with religious, or any other, belief.
Fourth, Mill is not saying that no man must be silenced because every man has a "right" to freedom of speech. Consistent skeptic that he is, he warns us-and from an early momentthat he disclaims any advantage that might accrue to his argument from an appeal to abstract right; he is going to justify his position in terms of "utility," in terms of "the permanent interest of a man [sic] as a progressive being,"'21 whatever that may mean; and he sticks scrupulously to at least the first half of the promise throughout the Essay. have meant-whether indeed he means anything at all that people committed to the idea of abstract right might find intelligible-by such words as "ethical," "immoral," etc.; as to (b) the pains Mill takes, throughout his main argument, to reduce the question, "Should some types of expression be prohibited in civilized society because the ideas they express are wicked?" to the question, "Should some types of expression be prohibited because they are intellectually incorrect?"; and as to (c) the kind of moral fervor his followers have poured into the propagation of his views. Everything reduces itself for Mill to intellectual argument, where you either win or draw or lose by the sheer appeal to reason-which, for Mill, excludes ex hypothesi any appeal to revelation or authority, for that would merely precipitate an endless discussion as to the status, from the standpoint of reason, of revelation and authority.
The notion of a "right" to freedom of speech, a capacity on the part of every man to say what he pleases that society must respect, because he is entitled to it-of a right that men have to live in the kind of society that Mill projects-is a later development. It occurs in different countries for different reasons and under different auspices; but to the extent that it is intended seriously it represents a complete break with Mill. Those who appeal to such a notion therefore have in his own shrewd example a warning that they must not attempt to do so on his grounds ;22 and much current confusion about the open society would be avoided if they would but take the warning to heart. In short, if we are going to speak of a right to freedom of speech, a right to live in an open society, we are going to have to justify it with arguments of a different character from Mill's, and so move the discussion onto a plane entirely different from Mill's. We are, above all, going to have to subordinate what we have to say to certain rules of discourse from which Mill, by his own fiat, is happily free. For any such right is inconceivable save as one component of a system or complex of rights, that mutually limit and determine one another and are meaningless save as they are deemed subject to the general proposition that we are not entitled to the exercise of any right unless we discharge the duties correlative to that right. Once we begin to argue from premises of that sort we shall begin to talk sense, not non- 22 We must distinguish here between a "natural" or "ethical" "right" to freedom of expression and a mere constitutional right. The case for the latter could of course be rested upon Mill's grounds, insofar as they are valid. sense, about freedom of speech and the open society. And the essence of the sense, I hasten to add, will be found to lie in the fact that we are no longer driving the roots of our doctrine into the soil of skepticism, because (as I have suggested already) once we speak of a right23 we have already ceased to be skeptics. And nothing is more certain than that we shall come out with something quite different from Popper's conception of the open society.
Fifth, Mill was fully aware (as his disciples seem not to be) both of the novelty and of the revolutionary character of his proposal for a society organized around the notion of freedom of speech. Just as he deliberately cuts himself off from any appeal to the notion of abstract right, so does he cut himself off from any appeal to tradition. Not only had no one ever before taught his doctrine concerning freedom of speech. No one had ever taught a doctrine even remotely like his. No one, indeed, had ever discussed such a doctrine even as a matter of speculative fancy.24 Hardly less than Machiavelli, and more than Hobbes, Mill is in full rebellion against both religion and philosophy, and so in full rebellion also against the traditional society that embodies them.25 Hardly less than Machiavelli, he conceives himself a "new prince in a new state,"26 obliged to destroy what has preceded him so that he may create what he feels stirring within him.27 Hardly less than Machiavelli, again, he is a teacher of evil: all truths that have preceded his are (as we have noted in passing above) at most partial truths, and enjoy even that status only because Mill confers it upon them.28 To reverse a famous phrase, Mill thinks of himself as standing not upon the shoulders of giants but of pygmies. He appeals to no earlier teacher,29 identifies himself with nothing out of the past; and his doctrine of freedom of speech is, as I have intimated already, the unavoidable logical consequence of the denials from which his thought moves. Not, however, because it is in fact to be the public policy of the society he will found, not because it is to govern his followers' actions with respect to the 23 Again, we must except the merely constitutional right. 24 Plato, of course, contemplates a freedom of speech situation in Book IX of the Republic; but merely to show that it can result only in disaster. freedom of thought of others, but because it is the perfect weapon-perfect because of its alleged connection with the quest for truth-to turn upon the traditional society that he must overthrow. For he who would destroy a society must first destroy the public truth it conceives itself as embodying; and Mill's doctrine of freedom of speech, to the extent that it gets itself accepted publicly, does precisely that. I do not, I repeat, believe it can be separated from the evil teaching that underlies it; and nothing could be more astonishing than the incidence of persons amongst us who because of their religious commitments must repudiate the evil teaching, yet continue to embrace the doctrine.
Sixth My contention will be that, once the question is put in that way,30 we run up against some insuperable objections to his prescriptions in and of themselves-objections, moreover, that remain equally valid even if one starts out, unlike Mill, from a supposed "right," whether natural or constitutional, to freedom of speech. I shall argue the objections in a logical order such that if each in turn were overcome the remaining ones would still stand.
Mill's proposals have as one of their tacit premises a false conception of the nature of society, and are, therefore, unrealistic on their face. They assume that society is, so to speak, a debating club devoted above all to the pursuit of truth, and capable therefore of subordinating itself-and all other considerations, goods, and goals-to that pursuit. Otherwise, the proposals would go no further than to urge upon society the common-sense view that the pursuit of truth is one of the goods it ought to cherish (even perhaps that one which it is most likely, in the press of other matters, to fail to make sufficient provision for); that it will neglect this good only at its own peril (a point that could easily be demonstrated); and that, accordingly, it should give hard and careful thought to what kind of provision it can make for it without disrupting unduly the pursuit of other goods. But we know only too well that society is not a debating club-all our experience of society drives the point home-and that, even if it were one, like the UN General Assembly, say, the chances of its adopting the pursuit of truth as its supreme good are negligible. Societies, alike by definition and by the teaching of history, cherish a whole series of goods-among others, their own self-preservation, the living of the truth they believe themselves to embody already, and the communication of that truth (pretty much intact, moreover) to future generations, their religion, etc. -which they are not only likely to value as much as or more than the pursuit of truth, but ought to value as much as or more than the pursuit of truth, because these are preconditions of the pursuit of truth.
To put it a little differently, the proposals misconceive the strategic problem, over against organized society, of those individuals who do value the pursuit of truth above all other things. That strategic problem we may state as follows: fortunate that society that has even a small handful-a "select minority," in Ortega y Gasset's phrase-of persons who value the pursuit of truth in the way in which Mill imagines a society valuing it. Fortunate that select 30 I.e., as a problem for "empirical" political theory. minority in such a society, if it can prevail upon the society to provide it with the leisure and resources with which to engage in the pursuit of truth; or, failing that, at least not to stand in the way of its pursuit of truth. And wise that society whose decision-makers see deeply enough into things to provide that select minority-even in the context of guarantees against its abusing its privileges-the leisure and the resources it needs for the pursuit of truth. To ask more than that of society, to ask that it give that select minority freedom to treat publicly all questions as open questions, as open not only for itself in the course of its discharge of its own peculiar function but for everybody, is Utopian in the worst sense of the word; and so, certain to defeat the very purpose the asking is intended to serve. By asking for all, even assuming that all to be desirable, we imperil our chances of getting that little we might have got had we asked only for that little.
If we nevertheless waive that objection, we confront another, namely, that the proposals have as a further tacit premise a false conception of human beings, and how they act in organized society. Concretely, Mill not only assumes that speech (the professing and discussing of any doctrine, however immoral) is incapable of doing hurt in society. (He has to assume this, since he calls for non-interference with speech, while the overriding principle of the Essay is that society is always entitled to interfere in order to prevent hurt, whether to itself or to its individual members.) This is disturbing enough: Socrates, we recall, taught otherwise, namely, that he who teaches my neighbor evil does me hurt. But Mill also assumes (else again his proposal is romantic) that people can be persuaded either to be indifferent toward the possible tendency of what their neighbors are saying, or at least to act as if they were indifferent. We know nothing about people, I suggest, that warrants our regarding such an assumption, once it is brought out into the open, as valid. Thus his proposals, like all political proposals that call implicitly for the refashioning of human nature, can be enforced only through some large-scale institutional coercion. And I believe it to be this consideration, above all, that explains the failure of Mill's followers, to date, to persuade any organized society to adopt his proposals. We have no experience of unlimited freedom of speech as Mill defines it, of the open society as Popper defines it, unless, after a fashion and for a brief moment, in Weimar Germany-an experience no organized society will be eager to repeat.
Let us now turn to still another objection. I contend that such a society will become intol-erant, one in which the pursuit of truth can only come to a halt. Whatever the private convictions of the society's individual members concerning what Plato teaches us to call the important things (that is, the things with which truth is primarily concerned), the society itself is now, by definition, dedicated to a national religion of skepticism, to the suspension of judgment as the exercise of judgment par excellence. It can, to be sure, tolerate all expression of opinion that is predicated upon its own view of truth; but what is it to do with the man who steps forward to urge an opinion, to conduct an inquiry, not predicated on that view? What is it to do with the man who, with every syllable of faith he utters, challenges the very foundations of skeptical society? What can it say to him except, "Sir, you cannot enter into our discussions, because you and we have no common premises from which discussion between us can be initiated?" What can it do, in a word, but silence him, and look on helplessly as within its own bosom the opinions about the important things descend into an ever greater conforming dullness? Nor-unlike traditional society, which did not regard all questions as open questions-need it hesitate to silence him. The proposition that all opinions are equallyand hence infinitely-valuable, said to be the unavoidable inference from the proposition that all opinions are equal, is only one-and perhaps the less likely-of two possible inferences, the other being: all opinions are equally -and hence infinitely-without value, so what difference does it make if one, particularly one not our own, gets suppressed?3" This we may 31 Cf. Bertrand de Jouvenel, On Sovereignty (Chicago: 1957), p. 288: "One of the strangest intellectual illusions of the nineteenth century was the idea that toleration could be ensured by moral relativism....
The relativist tells us that the man professing opinion A ought to respect opinion B, because his own opinion A has no more intrinsic value than B. But in that case B has no more than A. Attempts to impose either would be attempts to impose what had no intrinsic value; but also suppression of either would be suppression of what had no intrinsic value. And in that case there is no crime . . . in the suppression of contrary opinions." On equality of opinions in Mill, see note 16 supra. On the progress in Mill from "equally valuable" to "equally and infinitely valuable," cf. op. cit., p. 46: " . . . truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it, every opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds advocates, but is so advocated as to be listened to." And the presumption, he insists, is that every opinion does contain some fraction of the truth: " . . . it is always probable that dissentients have something worth hearing fairly call the central paradox of the theory of freedom of speech. In order to practice tolerance on behalf of the pursuit of truth, you have first to value and believe in not merely the pursuit of truth but Truth itself, with all its accumulated riches to date. The all-questions-are-open-questions society cannot do that; it cannot, therefore, practice tolerance towards those who disagree with it. It must persecute-and so, on its very own showing, arrest the pursuit of truth.
I next contend that such a society as Mill prescribed will descend ineluctably into everdeepening differences of opinion, into progressive breakdown of those common premises upon which alone a society can conduct its affairs by discussion, and so into the abandonment of the discussion process and the arbitrament of public questions by violence and civil war. This is the phenomenon-we may call it the dispersal of opinion-to which Rousseau, our greatest modern theorist of the problem, recurred again and again in his writings.32 The all-questions-are-open-questions society cannot endeavor to arrest it, by giving preferred status to certain opinions and, at the margin, mobilizing itself internally for their defense; for by definition it places a premium upon dispersion by inviting irresponsible speculation and irresponsible utterance. As time passes, moreover, the extremes of opinion will-as they did in Weimar-grow further and further apart, so that (for the reason noted above) their bearers can less and less tolerate even the thought of one another, still less one another's presence in society. And again the ultimate loser is the pursuit of truth.
Still another tacit premise of the proposals is the extraordinary notion that the discussion process, which correctly understood does indeed forward the pursuit of truth, and does indeed call for free discussion, is one and the same thing with Mill's unlimited freedom of speech. They rest, in consequence, upon a false conception of the discussion process. What they will produce is not truth but rather only deafening noise and demoralizing confusion. For the essence of Mill's freedom of speech is the divorce of the right to speak from the duties correlative to the right; the right to speak is a right to speak ad nauseam, and with impunity. It is shot through and through with the egalitarian overtones of the French Revolution, which are as different from the measured aristocratic overtones of the pursuit of truth by discussion, as understood by the tradition Mill was attacking, as philosophy is different from phosphorus.
Of the latter point we may sufficiently satisfy ourselves, it seems to me, by recalling how the discussion process works in those situations in which men who are products of the tradition organize themselves for a serious venture in the pursuit of truth-as they do in, say, a branch of scholarship, an academic discipline, and the community of truth-seekers corresponding to it.33 Such men demonstrably proceed on some such principles as these: (a) The pursuit of truth is indeed forwarded by the exchange of opinions and ideas among many; helpful suggestions do indeed emerge sometimes from surprising quarters; but one does not leap from these facts to the conclusion that helpful suggestions may come from just anybody. (b) The man or woman who wishes to exercise the right to be heard has a logically and temporally prior obligation to prepare himself for participation in the exchange, and to prepare himself in the manner defined by the community. Moreover (c), from the moment he begins to participate in the exchange, he must make manifest, by his behavior, his sense of the duty to act as if the other participants had something to teach him-the duty, in a word, to see to it that the exchange goes forward in an atmosphere of courtesy and mutual self-respect. Next (d), the entrant must so behave as to show that he understands that scholarly investigation did not begin with his appearance on the scene, that there is a strong presumption that prior investigators have not labored entirely in vain, and that the community is the custodian of-let us not sidestep the mot justean orthodoxy, no part of which it is going to set lightly to one side. (e) That orthodoxy must be understood as concerning first and foremost the frame of reference within which the exchange of ideas and opinions is to go forward. That frame of reference is, to be sure, subject to change, but this is a matter of meeting the
